Fishy Gifts: Bribing with Shame and Guilt by Ong, David
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Fishy Gifts: Bribing with Shame and
Guilt
David Ong
Peking University HSBC School of Business
May 2008
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/35197/
MPRA Paper No. 35197, posted 5 December 2011 16:30 UTC
Fishy Gifts: Bribing with Shame and Guilt
David Ong
December 11, 2009
Abstract
The following is a model of psychological contracting with unmonitorable perfor-
mance, implicit o¤ers, and screening for non-performance by the announcement of the
expectation of performance. It is motivated by the $250 billion prescription drug in-
dustry, which spends $19 billion per year on marketing to US doctors, mostly on gifts,
and often, as at Yale, with no monitoring for reciprocation. In one revealing incident,
a drug rm representative closed her presentation to Yale medical residents by handing
out $150 medical reference books and remarking, "one hand washes the other." By the
next day, half the books were returned. I model this with a one shot psychological trust
game with negative belief preferences and asymmetric information. I show that the
shameof accepting a possible bribe can screen for reciprocation inducing guilt. An
announcement can extend the e¤ect. Current policies to deter reciprocation might aid
such screening. I also discuss applications like vote buying when voting is unobservable
and why taxis drivers in Naples announce inated fares after their service is sunk.
JEL Codes: C72, D82, D86, H51, H75, I11, I18, M31, M37
Keywords: psychological contracting, bribery, guilt, shame, gifts, drug rms, doc-
tors, social norms, indirect speech, trust game, credence goods
1 Introduction1
Medical professionals, health policy makers, and the public have become increasingly con-
cerned at the coincidence of:
1) rising expenditure on prescription drugs: $64 billion in 1995, $151 billion in 2001 and
$252 billion in 2006 [Herper and Kang, 2006] (with an estimated one-quarter of this increase
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resulting from a shift to the prescribing of more expensive drugs [Dana and Loewenstein,
2003])
2) extraordinary protability of drug rms not commensurate with innovation: 76% were
deemed only moderately more e¢ caciousby the US Food and Drug Administration [Dana
and Loewenstein, 2003], and
3) large expenditures on marketing to doctors: $18,000-$29,000 [Brennan et. al., 2006]
per doctor per year mostly on gifts.
There has been much speculation about what is actually happening. (See Appendix B:
Background on Pharmaceutical Industry Gift Giving for more details.) I focus on a revealing
incident that occurred several years ago at Yale New Haven Hospital. After the pharma-
ceutical rm representative (Drug Rep) closed her presentation to Yale medical residents
(doctors in training) by handing out medical reference books worth $150, she unexpectedly
remarked, that "one hand washes the other" (from now on referred to as "insinuation"). By
the next day, half the books were returned. According to an informal survey by the Director
of the residency program, those who returned the books claimed that they were shocked by
the Drug Reps quid pro quo o¤er. The other half claimed that they had known the bribing
intent all along, had discounted the gesture, and hence, would not have been inuenced in
their prescribing2.
This incident raises several questions of economic interest.
A) Why are gifts given when they cannot be conditioned on increased prescribing? Yale,
for example, does not release prescribing data to any rms3.
B) How can an announcement make a good into a bad?
C) Under what conditions would the Drug Rep want to make such an announcement?
I address these questions in a model of psychological contracting where: 1) performance
is unmonitorable, 2) o¤ers are veiled (which captures the usual case where gifts are given
and nothing is said), and 3) the mere announcement of the expectation of performance
(e.g., "one hand washes the other...") can either enforce performance or screen for non-
performance. Applied to Yale incident, I show that the shame of accepting a possible bribe,
rather than being a hindrance to bribing, can in fact be instrumental to making e¤ective
bribes. (For more details on the psychological tactics used by drug rms to inuence doctors,
see [Fugh-Berman and Ahari, 2007].)
In this introduction, I will develop my model by ruling out simpler models. Due to
unmonitorability, any model of this situation would have to be one shot. But, in a game
where the Drug Rep (she) can give a gift, or not, and the Doctor (he) has a choice of
2Reported by a former Yale Medical resident Melinda L. Randall.
3Private communication with the Director of Pharmacy Services at Yale-New Haven Hospital.
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making reciprocating prescriptions (reciprocating) at some cost, or not, the Doctor would not
reciprocate and hence, the Drug Rep would not give. Even if we were to make this a standard
psychological game, where the Doctor felt guilt4 (modelled as the product of guilt sensitivity
and the Doctors belief about the Drug Reps belief in reciprocation) from disappointing the
expectation of the Drug Rep for reciprocation, that would not explain the announcement and
its e¤ect returned books. Similarly, "kindness" as in [Rabin, 1993], could be a motive for
reciprocation, but not for rejection. Nor would the mere introduction of shame5 (modelled
as the product of shame sensitivity and the second order expectation for reciprocation)
from the expectation of doing something bad, as also developed in [Tadelis, 2008]6. Tadelis
showed that the threat of merely being observed can deter a bad action. But here, the
subsequent prescribing of the doctors was not observable. Its important to note that the
gift (understood as a monetary incentive) was sunk and hence xed. Behavior nonetheless
changed after the mere announcement of expectations. Thus, models of monetary incentive
schemes crowding other incentives like [Benabou and Tirole] would not apply. [Ong, 2008a]
simulated aspects of the incentives of the above Yale incident in a controlled laboratory
experiment and conrmed the prediction that a shame can sort.
To explain the announcement and rejection, I interact shame and guilt in the context
of previously mentioned pyschological trust game. In this game, I introduce double sided
asymmetric information, giving with insinuation as a second way of giving (from now on sim-
ply referred to as insinuating), and observable acceptance, but unobservable reciprocation.
Reciprocation is now also shameful before other people7.
There are now two types of Drug Reps h and l. l only benets from reciprocation and
thus, her expectation for reciprocation can be inferred from her giving. The h type of Drug
Rep, which may only exist in the mind of the Doctor, is not so restricted8. h also su¤ers a
cost from giving with insinuation, which makes it less preferred than mere giving. There are
two types of Doctors, a highly shame averse type (H) and a not so highly shame averse type
(L). The sequence of play is as follows. Nature moves to choose the types of Drug Reps and
4See [Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2008] for a general model of guilt, and [Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006]
and [Fong et. al., 2007] for experimental evidence that guilt can induce reciprocation.
5Shame is distinct from guilt or even "blame from guilt" as in [Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007] because
it need not involve disappointment of expectations. Rather, one is ashamed because of what others expect
one to do, or has seen us do.
6I use second order beliefs, which allow for interesting o¤-equilibrium results. [Tadelis, 2008] only uses
rst order beliefs.
7The Doctor can be interpreted as feeling shame at acceptance before a passive player, the Patient, or
other doctors, or even before the Drug Rep herself.
8As reported in the Yale incident and as shown in surveys [Kaiser Foundation Survey, 2001], a signicant
portion did not suspect that drug rms are out to inuence their prescribing with gifts. Drug rms promo-
tional material try to conrm this impression. See their websites (e.g., www.pzer.com). Hospitals, including
Yale, have instructional interventions for doctors to explain how drug rms may be trying to inuence them.
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Doctors facing each other. The Drug Rep can then: 1) give a gift, 2) give and insinuate, and
3) not give, where 2) is more costly for the h Drug Rep. Each type of Doctor observes the
Drug Reps choice and updates his beliefs on the type of Drug Rep he faces. The Doctor then
chooses to accept or reject given the shame of acceptance. Observers update their beliefs on
which type of Doctor is accepting. Each type of Doctor chooses to reciprocate or not given
his guilt.
Due to asymmetric information about the Drug Reps type, the Doctors guilt now de-
pends upon his belief that he is facing the bribing Drug Rep and his belief that the bribing
Drug Rep is expecting reciprocation from his type. Due to unobservability of the shameful
act, reciprocation, an otherwise innocuous act, acceptance, is shameful for everyone when
anyone reciprocates. Formally, the shame of acceptance is now the product of each type
of Doctors shame sensitivity and the type weighted average of beliefs about beliefs about
the rates of reciprocation of all types of Doctors who accept. In other words, shame is
here modelled as a function of ex ante beliefs, while guilt is modelled as a function of ex
post beliefs9. Equilibrium behavior then becomes driven by the interplay between, shame,
a public badamong all types who accept, and guilt, a private badfor each who disap-
points an expectation for reciprocation from his type10. The announcement, which increases
guilt at non-reciprocation, increases reciprocation, which increases the ex-ante expectation
of reciprocation, which increases the shame of acceptance and hence, decreases acceptance.
Thus, due to the interplay between shame and guilt, the Drug Rep is faced with a trade-o¤
between reciprocation per acceptance and acceptance, when deciding how much to veil her
o¤er11.
The model is predictive given the correlation between shame and guilt sensitivities of the
Doctors present. The most interesting cases are partial pooling equilibrium when both types
of Doctors accept but only one is reciprocating, i.e., the other is free-riding. One such case is
when there is strong negative correlation between shame and guilt sensitivities (Equilibrium
9This is consistent with the psychological and economics literature. See [Tadelis, 2008] and [Tangney,
Dearing, 2002]:
10Thus, in a partial pooling equilibrium, where both types of Doctors are accepting, but only H is recipro-
cating, only the H type can feel guilt in deviating to not reciprocate. However, though L is not reciprocating
(and hence, not expected to) he will nonetheless feel the same shame as H at acceptance, because the Patient
cannot tell them apart. In other words, shame is a function of the ex-ante belief of reciprocation (because
the Patient does not know which type of Doctor is accepting) and guilt is a function of the ex-post belief
(because each type of Doctor knows what is expected of him in equilibrium). Thus, in a pooling equilibrium,
shame is a public bad among all who accept, but guilt is a private bad for each who does not reciprocate,
when he is expected to reciprocate. It is the interaction between these two bads that drives the behavior of
the Doctors, and ultimately, the behavior of the Drug Rep.
11This trade-o¤ between directness and indirectness may also explain why cash gifts are generally not used
with doctors. They are too direct. Observers infer (perhaps incorrectly) that everyone who would accept
would reciprocate. Because of that, no one would accept.
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3). In this case, H, the type who is most sensitive to shame, and hence, most likely to reject,
is least sensitive to guilt and hence, least likely to reciprocate. Then a gift alone can screen
for non-reciprocation. To induce this H to reject, the Drug Rep can merely buy a cheaper
gift before the game begins (Equilibrium 2). In contrast, when there is not strong negative
correlation, a gift alone cannot screen for non-reciprocation. For example, with positive
correlation, L, the type who is the least sensitive to shame, and hence, least likely to reject,
is the least sensitive to guilt, and hence, least likely to reciprocate (Equilibrium 3H)12. A
gift rejected by L would also be rejected by H, the type who is most likely to reciprocate.
In some of these cases, the Drug Rep can increase the guilt of L enough by insinuating to
cause him to also reciprocate (Equilibrium 4)13. If instead H had been free-riding, as can
be the case when there is weakly negative correlation (Equilibrium 3L), the Drug Rep can
in some of these cases get rid of H by insinuating (Equilibrium 6). Furthermore, even if H
had been reciprocating (Equilibrium 3¯H), if the shame externality of L reciprocating would
force a trade-o¤ between either H accepting or L accepting, the Drug Rep could still choose
L over H (Equilibrium 5L). I show using the Intuitive Criterion that insinuation works as
an equilibrium renement of the partial pooling equilibrium, causing separation.
Assuming that the Drug Rep insinuated rationally in the Yale incident, my results show
that those who kept the gift and said that they would not have reciprocated were in fact
lying. Those who had rejected the gift were lying only if Equilibrium 4 applied.
In the policy section, I show that:
1. Perversely, gift registries and educational interventions can help the Drug Rep (Pro-
poser) screen for reciprocation because they act like insinuation.
2. Bans on gifts imply o¤-equilibrium beliefs that shame all doctors, even those who
would not have accepted. This helps to explain why bans, the most obvious solution,
has been used only in a handful of hospitals.
3. Surveys of doctors beliefs about what their colleagues would do, had they accepted an
expensive gift, can enlist non-credible shame to deter those who would have accepted
and not reciprocated from accepting14.
12The numbers to denote these equilibria will be followed by the letter of the reciprocating type. For
example, in "Equilibrium 3H" both are accepting but only H is reciprocating. In contrast, in "Equilibrium
3", all types who accept are reciprocating.
13Equilibria a) 3H and 4, b) 3L and 6, c) 3¯H and 5L are pairs of equilibria for the same parameter ranges
of shame and guilt sensitivities. The Drug Rep can move from the rst to the second of the pair if she
insinuates. I show that she will insinuate if doing so would increase her prots and if she believes that the
Doctor can forward induct, i.e., are rational enough to reason through an equilibrium renement.
14The o¤-equilibrium belief results arise from a novel notion of "belief supports," which contain beliefs
about what a type of Doctor would have done, had he accepted. Such an unreached belief support may
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1.0.1 Other Applications
Beyond the $252 billion US prescription drug market, the $89 billion student loan industry
also employed gifts to market loan products to nancial aid councilors. See [New America
Foundation, 2009] for a large listing of articles on the topic. Preliminary research indicates
that, like drug rms, loan rms could not monitor for reciprocation in the form of recommen-
dations of their products to students, and may also have relied upon psychological factors like
guilt and shame to target gifts to get reciprocation. Guilt and shame may have important
unobservable inuence on the subjective judgments of credit rating and accounting agencies
when their consulting arms get lucrative contracts. Reciprocation for bribes in elections
are also unobservable. After voters accept the bribe, they can still vote however they like.
Shame modulated by insinuation may also be used there to screen for reciprocation.
My model may also help explain more mundane behavior like why taxi drivers in Naples,
who have no meters, tell you the price of the ride after you arrive, when their service is sunk.
Announcing a high price after arrival would be rational, if those who were less likely to ask
for the price before the ride, e.g., out of shame from looking cheap, would also be averse
to disappointing the expectations of the taxi driver, formed perhaps during the ride, after
arriving.
A scandal in a duciary eld can change expectations just like insinuation did in the Yale
incident. In [Ong, 2008a], I show how the shame from a scandal may sort out those who
are most trustworthy from a duciary eld, as Enron may have done in accounting. That
raises the question of how expert professions might select for trustworthy people and hence,
conserve the trust they need to function. Using another variant of this model, I demonstrate
in [Ong, 2008b] why the pro bono work among doctors, which amounted to $12 billion in
2001, may help screen out people who would cheat on their patients, and hence damage the
reputation of all doctors. I use another variant of this model to capture the phenomena of
bundling to avoid shame in consumer products (e.g., the inclusion of political articles with
female nudes in Playboy during the 1950s or Biblical themes in nudes from the Renaissance).
(See [Ong, 2008c] for details.)
The model is in section 2. I dene the equilibrium concept in section 3.1, develop aspects
of equilibria in section 3.2 and list propositions proved in section 3.3. Proofs are in Appendix
D, which is available upon request.
contain non-credible beliefs about what that doctor H would have done had he accepted. More details about
this and the Weak Sequential Equilibrium concept in Appendix C.
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2 The Model
2.1 Game Structure
The model can be summarized as a standard trust game with two types of Proposers
1 2 fl; hg facing two types of Responders 2 2 fH;Lg, with observable acceptance a
but unobservable reciprocation r. Proposers also have two ways of giving g1 and g2 with g1
standing for giving and g2 standing for giving and insinuating. Here H stands for highly
shame averse and L stands for not so highly shame averse.
The sequence of play is:
1. Nature moves rst to choose pairs of Proposers and Responders; the l Proposer
with probability p1 and L Responder with probability p2.
2. Each type of Proposer may give a gift g1 or give and insinuate g2 or not give 15.
3. Each type of Responder may accept a or not accept :a:
4. If he accepts, he may reciprocate r or not reciprocate :r, unobserved by the
Proposer (and Patient).
The game tree is in Appendix A.
I look at parameter ranges in which the not giveis dominated, so that it can be omitted,
since nothing interesting happens if the Proposer does not want to give. To avoid introducing
further notation in an already complicated model, I will let action letters a and r also stand
for mixed behavioral strategies in those few places where they are needed, e.g., when they
determine equilibrium beliefs. My analysis is otherwise limited to pure strategy equilibria.
2.2 Responders Payo¤ and Information
v =value of the gift. e =cost of reciprocation. v > e > 0: For each type of Responder
2 2 fH;Lg :
 2 =guilt sensitivity where 2 > 0:
 2 =shame sensitivity where 2 > 0 and H > L > 0:
 The presence of a passive observer (the Patient) is reected in the Responders height-
ened shame sensitivity.
15I only look at the situations where the Proposer wants to give in at least one of the two ways. To avoid
clutter, I omit notation of not giving.
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I 2 I is information set of the Proposer after Responder accepts, modelling the Proposers
uncertainty as to which type of Responder accepted and whether that type is reciprocating
or not. There are four such information sets, one for each combination of Proposer and
her actions: I = fIlg2 ; Ilg1 ; Ihg2 ; Ihg1g : Each of those information sets contain four possible
histories, which di¤er only as to whether a certain type of Responder reciprocated or not16.
Let:
 1 =updated belief that the Proposer is the l type given that she gives, gives and
insinuates or does not give.
 2 =updated belief that the Responder is the L type given observed acceptance. In
equilibrium, 2 =
p2aL
p2aL+(1 p2):aH : the prior weighted ratio of the rate of acceptance of
the L type to acceptances by either types.
Since the Responder has preferences over Proposers beliefs, in equilibrium, he will, in
a sense to be dened in the equilibrium concept below in section 3, have beliefs in his
utility function.  (I) and 2 (I) should be interpreted as payo¤ parameters when in utility
functions and beliefs otherwise. They are equal in equilibrium.
  (I) =Responders belief about the observers belief about the rate of reciprocation of
whoever is accepting at I 2 I. Hence,  (I) = 1 would be the second order belief that
"whoever accepts reciprocates."
 2 (I) =Responder 2s belief of observersbelief about 2s rate of reciprocation after
acceptance. Hence, 2 (I) = 1 would be the 2s second order belief that "if I accept,
I would be expected to reciprocate."
In equilibrium, the average rate of reciprocation conditional on acceptance  (I) is the 2
weighted average of beliefs about the rate of reciprocation 2 (I) of each type 2 conditional
on acceptance. The conditional beliefs are used here because I assume that Responders care
about the beliefs of Proposers only if they accept.
 (I) = L (I)  2 + H (I)  (1  2) (1)
The support of 2 (I) is represented by dashed belief support setsin the tree in Ap-
pendix A. The standard information sets which enclose the belief support sets represent the
16In Ibi; where the bribing Proposer (b) has insinuated (i), for example, the possible histories would be:
f(BL; i; a; r) ; (BL; i; a;:r) ; (BH; i; a; r) ; (BH; i; a;:r)g
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uncertainty of an observer who knows neither which type is accepting, nor whether they are
reciprocating.
Payo¤ of Responder after:
1. non-acceptance: 0:
2. accepting and reciprocating: v   e  2 (I) :
3. accepting and not reciprocating: v   122 (I)  2 (I) :
2.3 Proposers Payo¤
Though I do provide justications for how I model the Proposer, the Proposers actions
should be regarded as providing the framework for the main focus of the paper the analysis
of how shame and guilt can be used to manipulate the behavior of the Responder. What
the reader should take away is that
1. The l Proposer must anticipate reciprocation whenever it gives in equilibrium.
2. Upon observing g2; Responders should believe that they are facing l; since g2 is domi-
nated for h but not for l 17.
More specically, I assume that the insinuation is free for the l Proposer and she cares
only about material payo¤s. Hence, her payo¤s from insinuating or not depends only upon
the Responders consequent acceptance and rate of reciprocation. (There are many ways
to model the above assumptions. I outline somewhat cumbersome way below.) Acceptance
increases costs by k and reciprocation increases revenue by R. Let g22f0; 1g be the rate
of insinuation for the Proposer and rg2 be the rate of reciprocation for the Responder. The
prots for the l Proposer is then:
l
 
g2; rg2

=
 
rg2 R +
 
1  rg2
  0  k =  rg2R  k (2)
Since the l Proposer is not sure about which type of Responder she is facing, she chooses g2
to maximize her expected payo¤s:
max
g2
E
 
l
 
g2; rg2

= max
g2

2
 
rLg2R  k

+ (1  2)
 
rHg2R  k
	
(3)
17A casual perusal of drug rm websites will show that drug rm promotion portray drug rms as altruistic,
or the least, not just prot maximizing. As late as 2001, 40% of doctors did not realize that drug rms
monitored their prescribing patterns [Kaiser Foundation Survey, 2001]. According to [Madhavan et. al.,
1997], "physicians slightly agreed that pharmaceutical companies give gifts to physicians to inuence their
prescribing." Hospitals like Yale New Haven Hospital have educational interventions that basically tell doctors
that drug rms are very likely trying to a¤ect their prescribing through gifts. Again, see [Fugh-Berman and
Ahari, 2007] for more details on the psychological/relationship tactics used by drug rms to inuence doctors.
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Clearly, the l Proposer will only give if she is making non-negative prots. This requires
that, if either type of Responder accepts, at least one reciprocates; xing a choice of either
g2= 1 or qg2= 1; if rL = 1 or rH = 1, the Proposer earns positive prots.
R (p2 (rL) + (1  p2) (rH)) > k (4)
3 Equilibrium Analysis
3.1 Psychological Weak Sequential Equilibrium
I weaken the psychological sequential equilibrium (PSE) concept introduced by [Battigalli
and Dufwenberg, 2008] so as to get some novel o¤-equilibrium path results (See Appendix
C). However, for the basic results in the body of the paper, PSE and Weak Psychological
Equilibrium (WPSE), discussed below, are equilivalent.
A psychological Bayesian extensive form game is a collection of Bayesian extensive form
games   parametrized by 2 ; 2 2 fH;Lg :
  =
D
N;H; (i) ; (pi) ;
 
u
i
 
2

822f0;1g;822fH;Lg
E
(5)
As in a standard Bayesian extensive form game, N is the set of players, H is the set of
histories, i is the set of types for each player i, pi is the prior probability distribution of
player i over other players types and u
i
is the utility of player i. The key di¤erence here
is the use of the utility parameters 2 ; 2 2 fH;Lg to specify each of the standard games
G 2  : Within each of these games, which xes the value of 2 ; 2 2 fH;Lg, each type of
Proposer chooses to give g1 or insinuate and give g2, or not give, given her belief 2 of facing
L and expected rates of reciprocation after acceptance. Each type of Responder decides
on acceptance or non-acceptance given his shame aversion 2; the value of the gift v and
his anticipated consequent guilt, should he not reciprocate, or his cost of reciprocation e,
should he reciprocate: After acceptance, each type of Responder would choose to reciprocate
r or not, given his guilt aversion 22, his cost of reciprocating e; and his belief about the
Proposers expectation of type 2s reciprocation rate 2 . Consistency between beliefs and
actions requires that
2 (I) = r2 (I) ;8I 2 I;82 2 fH;Lg (6)
This denes the WSEs for each G 2  . The PWSEs are what remains of the WSEs in
  after we throw out every WSEs in which the beliefs 2 are not consistent with the payo¤
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parameter 2 that they should stand in for, for every type 2 at every information set I on
the equilibrium path 18. In other words, the PWSEs are the restriction of G 2   such that:
2 (I) {beliefs} = 2 (I) {utility parameter};8I 2 I;82 2 fH;Lg
I will call my equilibrium concept psychological weak sequential equilibrium(PWSE),
which is based on the weak sequential equilibrium concept (WSE)19. In a WSE, every player
maximizes his utility at every information set and beliefs are Bayesian where possible.
3.2 Aspects of Equilibria
The Responder needs to rank four pure strategies (r; a) ; (r;:a) ; (:r; a) and (:r;:a) : Let
these rankings be represented in the following short hand:
(r  :r) := (r; a)  (:r; a)
(:r  :a) := (:r; a)  (r;:a) and (:r; a)  (:r;:a)
(r  :a) := (r; a)  (r;:a) and (:r; a)  (:r;:a)
(7)
the conditions for which I will derive in the following.
The (r qa) Condition: At each information set I 2 I for each type 2 2 fH;Lg ; recip-
rocate is better than not accept i¤:
v   e  2 (I)  0
The (qr qa) Condition: At each information set I 2 I for each type 2 2 fH;Lg ; not
reciprocate is better than not accept i¤:
v   122 (I)  2 (I)  0
18A psychological game can be interpreted as a short hand for a larger signaling game. Take Beer Quiche.
In a separating equilibrium, Player 2 (he) is sure of Player 1s type after observing her action. Therefore,
Player 2s belief about what action would occur in such an equilibrium can only depend upon his prior on
each type. Because Player 2s beliefs inuence Player 2s reaction to Player 1s signal, Player 1s payo¤s
depends upon Player 2s belief about what Player 1 will do. Player 1s payo¤s are then functions of Player 2s
beliefs about Player 1s actions. Even in the signaling game, the beliefs of Player 1 about Player 2s beliefs
must be consistent with the actual beliefs of Player 2, which must be consistent with the payo¤ parameter
that models the e¤ect of those beliefs upon Player 1s payo¤s. Hence, we have the essentials of a psychological
game. Player 1s has induced preferences upon Player 2s beliefs. See also [Gul and Pesendorfer, 2005] for
comments along the same lines.
19The established psychological sequential equilibrium concept (See [Battigalli and Dufwenberg,
2008])would preclude a number of interesting and realistic o¤-equilibrium phenomena (e.g., the screening
e¤ect of non-credible shame discussed in section 3.4.5).
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The (r qr) Condition: At each information set I 2 I for each type 2 2 fH;Lg ; recip-
rocate is better than not reciprocate i¤:
v   e  2 (I)  v   2 (I)  122 (I)
122 (I)  e
The (r qr; r qa) Condition: At each information set I 2 I for each type 2 2 fH;Lg ;
accept and reciprocate is best i¤:
v   e  2 (I) and 122 (I)  e
The (a qa) Condition: At each information set I 2 I, for each type 2 2 fH;Lg ; accept
is better than reject i¤:
max

v   e  2 (I) ; v   122 (I)  2 (I)
	  0
min

e; 122 (I)
	
< v   2 (I)
3.3 Characterization of Equilibria
In the following, equilibrium will be abbreviated to "Eq.". Since, I only need distinguish
beliefs that are after insinuation g2 and those that are after non-insinuation g1, I will only
write beliefs as a function of g2 or g1 (e.g., write 2 (g2) for 2 (I1g2) ; I1g2 2 I, 1 2 1; 2 2
2): In equilibria 1-3, the Proposers pool to g1. In equilibria 4-6, the l Proposer separates
to g2. To avoid repetition, I state only what each type of Responder does in the following
proposition.
3.3.1 No Insinuation Equilibria
To shorten my proofs, I characterize o¤-equilibrium beliefs, which are all the same, in the
following lemma, which apply to all propositions that follow. Since beliefs on the equilibrium
path are true and can be substituted away with their corresponding actions, they too are
omitted in the propositions.
Lemma 1 For a xed action of the l Proposer s1 2 fg2; g1g ; both Responders will accept
and not reciprocate
((aH (s1) = 1; rH (s1) = 0) ; (aL (s1) = 1; rL (s1) = 0)) (8)
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when H (s1) = L (s1) = 0. The l Proposers payo¤ will be  k:
Proposition 2 (Eq. 1) There exist equilibria in which both types of Responders accept and
reciprocate i¤
v   e  2 and p12  e;82 2 fH;Lg (9)
H (g1) = L (g1) = 1 (10)
Proposition 3 (Eq. 2) There exist equilibria in which the L type of Responder accepts and
reciprocates and the H type does not accept i¤
L (g1) = 1;  (g1) = 1; v   e  L and p1L  e (11)
H (g2) = 0 and L (g2) = 0 (12)
and 8><>:
a) H (g1) = 1; v   p1H < H and p1H < e
or
b) H (g1) = 0; H > v and p1H < e
9>=>; (13)
Proposition 4 (Eq. 3L) There exist equilibria in which both types of Responders accept
but only L reciprocates i¤
v   e  Lp2 and p1L  e (14)
0  v   Hp2 and p1H < e (15)
H (g1) = 0; L (g1) = 1;  (g1) = p2 (16)
L (g2) = L (g2) = 0 (17)
Proposition 5 (Eq. 3H) There exist equilibria in which both types of Responders accept
but only H reciprocates i¤
v   e  H (1  p2) and p1H  e (18)
0  v   L (1  p2) and p1L < e (19)
H (g1) = 1; L (g1) = 0;  (g1) = (1  p2) (20)
H (g2) = L (g2) = 0 (21)
Corollary 6 (Eq. 3¯H) Consider Eq. 3H. If v   e < H , then H only accepted if L also
accepted and but did not reciprocate.
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3.3.2 Insinuation Equilibrium
In the following equilibrium, the l Proposer separates from the h Proposer by insinuating g2.
Proposition 7 (Eq. 4) There exist equilibria in which the L type of Responder accepts and
reciprocates and the H type does not accept i¤
L (g2) = 1;  (g2) = 1; v   e  L and L  e (22)
H (g1) = L (g1) = 0 (23)
and 8><>:
a) H (g2) = 1; H > v   e and H  e
or
b) H (g2) = 0; H > v and H  e
9>=>; (24)
Proposition 8 (Eq. 5L) There exist equilibria in which the L type of Responder accepts
and reciprocates and the H type does not accept. More specically i¤
L (g2) = 1;  (g2) = 1; v   e  L and L  e (25)
H (g1) = 0 and L (g1) = 0 (26)
and 8><>:
a) H (g2) = 1; v   H < H and H < e
or
b) H (g2) = 0; H > v and H < e
9>=>; (27)
Proposition 9 (Eq. 6) There exist equilibria in which both types of Responders accept and
reciprocate. More specically i¤
v   e  2 and 2  e;82 2 fH;Lg (28)
H (g1) = L (g1) = 1 (29)
Proposition 10 Suppose that either Eq. 4 or Eq. 3H can hold. If the not highly shame
averse type L are numerous enough
p2 >
k
(R + k)
(30)
the Proposer would prefer the outcome in Eq. 4. Then, Eq. 3H can be eliminated with the
Intuitive Criterion.
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Proposition 11 Eq. 3L can be eliminated with the Intuitive Criterion. Eq. 5L would hold
instead.
3.4 Graphical Analysis of Equilibria
An equilibrium will be a pair of points on the shame and guilt plain (; ) 2 R2+ below.
Though in fact, we need a graph for each type of Responder 2 2 fH;Lg, if we assume
that priors on Responders types are symmetric,i.e., p2 = 12 ; we can use one graph, say
for type H, to represent best response regions for both types, when both are expected to
reciprocate. When one is not expected to reciprocate, then the best response graph for that
one has a vertical boundary at innity. In that case I only show the graph of the one that
is reciprocating. Even for the type who is expected to reciprocate, the boundary is "one
sided"; it only exists for decreasing guilt sensitivity. For increasing guilt sensitivity, if the
Responder had not been expected to reciprocate, no degree of guilt sensitivity will make him
want to reciprocate. (These graphs are a little strange and tricky to draw. I ask for the
readers patience.) Now, I will indicate how the boundaries of these best response regions for
gures 1-5 below were determined.
3.4.1 Horizontal Boundary for H : (r  :r)
The horizontal axis is divided up by the reciprocate is better than not reciprocate or
(r  :r) condition : 1HH  e; in which 1 (g1) = p1 in a pooling equilibrium (gure 2)
and 1 (g2) = 1 and 1 (g1) = 0 in a separating equilibrium (gure 3). Since, H 2 f0; 1g,
when (r  :r) is rewritten as H  e1H , the horizontal boundaries for H 2
n
0; e; e
p1
;1
o
.
3.4.2 Vertical Boundary for H : (r  :a)
The vertical boundary to the right of (r  :r) boundary is divided by the reciprocate is
better than not acceptor (r  :a) condition: v e  H; in which  = 1 p2 when both are
accepting but only H is reciprocating (see gure 1), or  = 1, when only the reciprocating
type accepts (gure 2). (If both were accepting and only L was reciprocating then, the
dividing line would be where  = p2.) Hence, when (r  :a) is rewritten v e  H : the
vertical boundaries for H 2
n
v e
1
; v e
1 p2
o
:
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3.4.3 Diagonal Boundary for H : (:r  :a)
The diagonal is divided by the not reciprocate is better than not acceptor (:r  :a)
condition for H : v  1HH   H  020. This condition, which can be more conveniently
written as v 1HH

 H only matters when not reciprocating is better than reciprocating
(:r  r) : 1HH < e and H has not accepted, i.e., H is in region :a: There are two
possibilities: H accepts or not.
 Should H have accepted and not reciprocated, consistency between beliefs and actions
would require that H = rH = 0. Thus, from the perspective of the H Responder who
has accepted and not reciprocated, the shame H boundary for accepting would be
dened by v

 H in which  = p2: (Not shown in any gure.)
 Should H not have accepted, then beliefs about Hs rate of reciprocation had he ac-
cepted are not constrained H 2 f0; 1g. Recall from 1 that
 = L  2 + H  (1  2)
 Suppose that H believes that had he accepted, he would have been expected to
reciprocate, then H = 1 and
v 1H

 H ; in which  = 1  1 + 0  1 = 1:
 If on the other hand, H believes that had he accepted, he would not have been
expected to reciprocate, then H = 0 and
v

 H ; in which  = 1  1 + 0  0 = 1:
Hence, when (:r  :a) is rewritten as v 1HH

 H ; the possible diagonal boundaries
are (H ; H) 2
n
(H ; H) : H =
v
p2
or v   1H   H = 0
o
:
The diagonal for L is comparable except that  = 1   p2 when both accept and H
reciprocates, but L does not reciprocate. See gure 2.
If both H and L have high enough guilt sensitivity to reciprocate, then the Proposer
only has to choose a gift v that will cause them to accept. This is the situation in Eq. 1
(not gured). If however, one type is not sensitive enough to guilt, and guilt and shame are
negatively correlated, the Proposer can choose a gift that only the less shame sensitive type
would accept. This is the situation Eq. 2 in gure 1.
20If H is considering :r  :a then, by the positive prot condition 4 and consistency 6, L must be
accepting and reciprocating: L = rL = 1:
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Figure 1: Only L accepts and reciprocates.
However, if guilt and shame are positively correlated, we may have the situation in Eq.
3H in gure 2.
3.4.4 Screening With Shame Spillovers
In Eq. 3H, the highly shame averse ResponderH; who has high shame and guilt sensitivity, is
accepting and reciprocating, while L; who has lower shame and guilt sensitivity, is accepting
but not reciprocating. In Eq. 4, the same H has not accepted, while L has accepted and
reciprocated. Eq. 3H has the L type of Responder in region :r and H in region r. Eq. 4
has this same L in region r and H in region :a. The bribing Proposer l, by separating with
an insinuation, increases guilt causing the L Responder with guilt range e  L  ep1 and
shame range 0  L  v   e (gure 2) to accept and reciprocate.
17
Figure 2: Both accept. Only H reciprocates.
When they do so, they exert a negative externality for their paired type in the guilt
range e
p1
 H and shame range 1  e  H  v e1 p2 that causes H to not accept (gure 3).
The solid arrow in gure 3 indicates the necessary marginal increase in the r region which
occurs when insinuation separates: 1 (g1) = p1 ! 1 (g2) = 1: The dotted arrows indicate
the possible changes in the boundaries after an insinuation, driven by changes in the value
of  = p2 !  = 1:
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Figure 3: Insinuation. Only L reciprocates.
Eq. 3H was maintained by the Proposers belief that, should there be an insinuation,
the Responder will infer he is facing the h Proposer and hence accept and not reciprocate.
Proposition 7 establishes that if the L type is great enough of the proportion of the Respon-
der population, the non-insinuation equilibria Eq. 3H will fail the Intuitive Criterion. Upon
observing insinuation, Responders can infer that they are facing the l Proposer, since insin-
uate is dominated for h. When L is a greater proportion of Responders, the L Responders
best response of reciprocate would be su¢ cient to make the l Proposer deviate to recipro-
cate. The prediction for this set of parameters would then be, the Proposer will insinuate.
She will lose the prescriptions of the highly shame averse type but gain the prescriptions of
the not highly shame averse type. This is what the Proposer in the Yale incident could have
been trying to achieve with her insinuation.
When there is negative correlation between guilt and shame, as in Eq. 3L, insinuation
can cause the non-reciprocating type H to not accept, as in Eq. 5L of gure 4. When there
is positive correlation, as in Eq. 3H, insinuation can cause the non-reciprocating type to
reciprocate, as in Eq. 6 of gure 4.
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Figure 4: Free-rider rejects (left) or reciprocates (right).
4 Discussion
4.1 Policy Implications
4.1.1 Bans
At rst, it may seem surprising that only a handful of medical schools out of thousands use
the most obvious solution: ban drug rep to doctor gift giving21. However, the rational for
the reluctance to ban can be seen in my model by. We can convert the drug rms revenues
from bribing:
R (p2 (rL) + (1  p2) (rH)) > 0
into a social utility constraint that must also be met for the gift giving to be permitted by
some social planner,
u  S (p2 (rL) + (1  p2) (rH))  0
21Harris, Gardiner, "Group Urges Ban on Medical Giveaways." New York Times, April 28, 2008, describes
a recent e¤ort to increase bans in medical schools.
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in which u is the social utility achieved by permitting gifts and S is the sensitivity to distorted
prescribing. Suppose that the regulator bans. Given a ban, doctors could infer that the
regulator believed that the rate of reciprocation would have made the ban worthwhile:
u  S < 0
where
 (I) = L (I)  2 + H (I)  (1  2) (31)
In other words, the regulator must have believed that the aggregate rate of reciprocation
would have been too high, if it had not banned. But, unlike Eq. 2 where shame could be
avoided by rejecting, when the regulator bans, all doctors su¤er shame through the implied
; all doctors would have su¤ered from the belief that they would have reciprocated enough
to warrant a ban. A persistent and unavoidable insult22 to the integrity of their profession
might deter entry of qualied people into a specic hospital, or in the health care industry
in general 23.
4.1.2 Gift Ceilings
A gift ceiling would work like a ban above the gift ceiling, with the same shaming o¤-
equilibrium belief implications. Instead of feeling completely untrusted, as with bans, doctors
would feel untrusted above the gift ceiling v. It would work like a buying a cheaper gift below
the gift ceiling, and thus could shift the situation away from Eq. 1 to Eq. 2 or 4, thus reducing
reciprocation by reducing acceptance.
4.1.3 Gift Registries
Gift registries, which record all gifts over a certain amount (e.g., $50), have been legislated
in a number of states24 [Ross et. al., 2007]. If preferences over beliefs are monotonic on the
number of people who have them, then gift registries amount to increasing ; the sensitivity
to shame. Increasing  amounts to decreasing v via a gift ceiling.
22 can also include the e¤ects of pencuniary punishments for acceptance contingent upon beliefs about
subsequent intended actions, if ^ =  + fines or if nes are a function of ; ^ = ( + fines). Both ^ > 
and v e >
v e
^ implies that the acceptance regions in all gures would shrink, reducing the e¤ectiveness of
gifts.
23Nearly 60 percent of doctors had considered getting out of medicine because of low morale (Williams,
Alex, "The Falling-Down Professions," New York Times, January 6, 2008).
24Medina, Jennifer, "Drug Lobbying Kills Gift Disclosure Bill," New York Times, June 29, 2006.
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4.1.4 Educational Interventions: Disambiguating The Meaning of the Gift
An initial study demonstrated that education as to the truemotives of rms and the social
costs of accepting gifts can indeed cut acceptance [Randall et. al., 2005]. If an educational
interventions did this by increasing  for all guilt sensitivity types, it would have the same
e¤ect as a ceiling on gift value. If on the other hand an educational intervention increased
doctorsbelief of facing the bribing Drug Rep, that would have the same e¤ect as the Drug
Rep always insinuating and hence, increasing 1 (g1) = p1 to 1 (g2) = 1, with the di¤erence
that it could save the rm representative from having to reveal her motive, and risking the
imposition of restricted access to doctors. As shown in Proposition 10 and 11, that could
result in more inuenced prescriptions by making it more protable. Counterintutively,
regulators could try to decrease the prior belief on the l type of Proposer 1 = p1 ! 0,
e.g., by promoting the idea that all rms are actually non-bribing. If that worked, guilt in
non-reciprocation would go down, which would eventually result in less giving with a bribing
intention.
Veiled o¤ers suggest that the rm believes that ambiguity is essential for a prot maxi-
mizing trade-o¤ between acceptance and reciprocation. If so, policy makers may be able to
disrupt the illicit exchange by disambiguating the beliefs of receivers. If Doctors uniformly
believed that nothing was expected of their type, i.e., 2 ! 0;82 2 fH;Lg, then the region
for acceptance will expand as its upper bound v e

!1; at the same time that the region
for not reciprocating r, whose lower bound is dened by e
12
! 1: Contrariwise, should
the situation be described by Eq. 3¯H, in which  = 1  p2 and both types of doctors accept,
but only :H type reciprocates, it could be best for policy makers to try to convince everyone
that all types of doctors are in fact reciprocating so as to increase ! 1 to prompt rejection
from a majority of doctors.
5 Conclusion
Doctors are experts. Expertise opens the client to expert relationship to exploitation by
third parties. The client cannot tell if the expert is acting in their best interest for the
same reason that the client needs the experts help. Hence, clients need to trust the experts
they go to. Hence also, experts must be averse to the appearance of betraying their clients
trust and therefore, anything approaching explicit contracting to betray that trust. Gifts
are a way for third parties to camouage such contracting. However, third parties face an
incentive problem similar to that which they may try to exploit; Expertise also makes the
experts actions unobservable to the third party. Contracts on those actions are therefore
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unenforceable by the usual means. Third parties need to trust their experts even to betray
the trust of others.
6 Appendix A
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7 Appendix B: Background on Pharmaceutical Indus-
try Gift Giving
Medical professionals, health policy makers, and the general public have become increasingly
concerned about the e¤ects of pharmaceutical company gifts to doctors in the face of costs
that have risen disproportionately to measures of e¢ cacy. These gifts range from free drug
samples to items unrelated to the products manufactured by the company, such as expensive
dinners, exotic vacation packages only tangentially related to short conferences or even large
payments for very undemanding "consulting work". Gifts constitute a signicant part of the
$19 billion[Brennan et. al., 2006]25 spent on marketing to 650,000 prescribing US doctors
including the salaries of 85,000 pharmaceutical rm representatives who visit an average
of 10 doctors per day. At the same time, patient spending on prescription medications has
more than doubled between 1995-2001 from $64 billion to $154.5 billion in 2001, with an
estimated one-quarter of this increase resulting from a shift among medical professionals to
the prescribing of more expensive drugs [Dana and Loewenstein, 2003]. This gure is on its
way to double again and totaled $252 billion in 2006 [Herper and Kang, 2006].
Increased costs could be due to better medicine. In 2000, the average price of these
"new" drugs was nearly twice the average price of existing drugs prescribed for the same
symptoms. But, according to [Dana and Loewenstein, 2003], the US Food and Drug Admin-
istration judged 76% of all approved new drugs between 1989 to 2000 to be only moderately
more e¢ cacious than existing treatments, many being a modication of an older product
with the same ingredients. Not surprisingly, pharmaceutical rms are among the most prof-
itable26 [Fortune 500, 2001-2005]. PhRMA, the drug industry trade group, claims that this
extraordinary protability is due to extraordinary risks taken, as indicated by their posted
R&D expenditures. Drug rms have been highly secretive about the specics of their R&D
spending data. One study argued that marketing dwarfs R&D spending by three fold [Public
Citizen, 2001].
Doctors rarely acknowledge the inuence of promotions on their prescribing. A num-
ber of studies, however, have established a positive relationship between prescription drug
promotion and sales. There is also a consensus in the literature that doctors who report re-
25Half is spent on free samples, which according to [Adair and Holmgren, 2005] shift doctor prescriptions
habit by 10%. Doctors are also less critical of the appropriateness of a drug when giving out free samples
[Morgan et. al., 2006]. As pointed out by a psychiatry blogger, rms may be feeding doctorsdesire to be
heroes in the eyes of their patients with free samples [Carlat, 2007]. Other initial evidence that free samples
do have a signicant impact on prescribing are in [Chew et. al., 2000].
26"From 1995 to 2002, pharmaceutical manufacturers were the nations most protable industry. They
ranked 3rd in 2003 and 2004, 5th in 2005, and in 2006 they ranked 2nd, with prots (return on revenues) of
19.6% compared to 6.3% for all Fortune 500 rms."[Kaiser Foundation, 2007]
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lying more on advertisements prescribe more heavily, more expensively, less generically, less
appropriately and often adopt new drugs more quickly, leading to more side e¤ects [Norris
et. al., 2005]. The bias in self assessment as to the e¤ects of promotion is illustrated dra-
matically in one study in which, after returning from all-expenses paid trips to educational
symposia in resort locations, doctors reported that their prescribing would not be increased.
Their tracked subsequent prescribing, however, attested to a signicant increase [Orlowski
and Wateska, 1992].
What exactly these gifts do is a topic of much debate. Drug rms have been monitoring
physician prescribing imperfectly since 1950 through various sampling techniques[Greene,
2007]. Beginning in the 1990s, they were able to purchase physician level data. One ma-
jor data provider to pharmaceutical rms, IMS Health, collects information on 70% of all
prescriptions lled in community pharmacies [Steinbrook, 2006] and had revenues over $2.7
billion in 2007. Since 2005, the AMA has received $44 million/year from licensing physician
data (the AMA Masterle) which contains physician proles for 900,000 physicians that can
be used with pharmacy prescriptions data to construct physician prescribing proles [Greene,
2007]. However, even as late as 2001, four in 10 physicians did not realize that drug industry
representatives had information about their prescribing practices[Kaiser Foundation Survey,
2001].
Drug rms claim that gifts are incidental to their motive to persuade and are used merely
to improve doctor attitude towards information presented to them27. Doctors themselves
admit that gifts increase the likelihood of their attendance at drug rm presentations. In
one survey however, 67% of faculty and 77% of residents believed accepting gifts could
inuence prescribing, especially if gifts greater than $100 were involved [Madhavan et. al.,
1997]. In another, 61% of physicians thought that their prescribing would be una¤ected
by expensive gifts like textbooks, but only 16% thought their colleagues would be similarly
una¤ected [Steinman et. al., 2001] 28. (From now on, this will be referred to as the 61/16
survey.) Furthermore, doctorsassessment as to whether they are a¤ected by gifts negatively
correlates with the amount and frequency of gifts they accept [Wazana, 2000].
There has been little or no state or federal sanctions of the amount or type of gifts that
a doctor can accept. The American Medical Association and PhRMA have both formally
recommended that doctors not accept gifts outside of textbooks with retail value greater
than $100 and no more than eight at a time29. Most doctors are not aware of even these
27A record $875 million ne against one rm for kickbacks and lavish gifts to get doctors to prescribe
more of its drugs shows that what drug rms provide is not always just information [Raw, 2002]. Note, that
crucially, the advertising and bribing motives for gifts are not mutually exclusive.
28The discrepancy between inuence on self and inuence on most other physicians is corroborated by
[Madhavan et. al., 1997].
29The AMA has been criticized for conict of interest for accepting $600,000 from drug rms to formulate
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guidelines and enforcement is unheard of. Perhaps under the pressure of public uproar and
the threat of regulation, many pharmaceutical rms adopted a similar code for themselves in
2002, and apparently to some e¤ect. A new code going into e¤ect in January 2009 prohibits
distribution of noneducational items to health care professionals including small gifts, such
as pens, note pads, mugs, and similar reminder itemswith company or product logos on
them, even if they are practice-related[Hosansky (2008)].
8 Appendix C
8.1 The Screening E¤ect of Non-Credible Shame
In my model, unobservable reciprocation occurs after observable acceptance. This dynamic
structure allows a Responder to reject based upon the shame attending on beliefs (about
others beliefs) about what he would have done, had he accepted. The di¤erence between his
beliefs and what he actually would have done can capture non-acceptance from an overes-
timation of shame. For some range of shame sensitivities in Eq. 2 and 4b, only the belief
whoever accepts reciprocateswould have been su¢ cient to deter acceptance. But in those
equilibria, had the highly shame averse type of Responder accepted, he would not have recip-
rocated. His guilt would not have been su¢ cient. In rejecting, the Responder would not
have taken into account the diminution of the aggregate reciprocation rate of all who accept
from his own non-reciprocating acceptance. This outcome models the possibility that those
who rejected in the Yale incident may not have taken into account the diminution of the
shame of acceptance, as a result of their own acceptance. In contrast, those who accepted
may have foreseen the possibility, as they themselves suggested.
More formally, recall that in dynamic games, o¤-equilibrium beliefs need not be con-
sistent with histories after an actual deviation. Such beliefs allow for the possibility of
incredible threats. In signaling games, the o¤-equilibrium beliefs themselves that an ob-
server best responds to need not be credible. These beliefs can be eliminated by forward
induction arguments like the Intuitive Criterion of [Cho and Kreps, 1987 ]. The key dif-
ference in psychological games is that the signallersown preferences depend directly upon
the observers beliefs (or his beliefs about them). These beliefs and their e¤ect upon the
signallers preferences can also be credible or not. They too may not withstand a forward
induction argument. In the separating equilibria of this game, the o¤-equilibrium beliefs of
the player who not accepted allow for non-credible shame and guilt.
In Eq. 2a and 2b, type Hs guilt sensitivity is not su¢ cient to induce reciprocation since
and promote this policy.
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H <
e
p1
: The non-acceptance condition :(a  :a) is dened as min fe; p1HHg > v H.
In order for H to reject in Eq. 2a, he must believe
1. If I accept, I will be expected to reciprocate. H = 1 and that others believe,
2. whoever accepts reciprocates = 1.
But, others know that H <
e
p1
: Therefore, cannot expect him to reciprocate: Therefore,
he cannot believe that they would expect him to reciprocate upon acceptance. Hence,
H = 0. But, if they did not believe that he would reciprocate, they could only believe that
whoever accepts might reciprocate < 1. Thus, the di¤erence in the shame sensitivity that
would keep H from accepting: H > v   p1H ; and the shame sensitivity that should keep
H from accepting: H  vp2 ; is in the shame region vp2  H  v   p1H and e > p1H :
(See dashed triangle marked (2) in gure 5.) If the Proposer insinuates, this region would
be v
p2
 H  v   H and e > H :
Figure 5: No Insinuation. Only L reciprocates.
In Eq. 2b, H believes that, had he accepted, he would not have been expected to recip-
rocate H = 0. It was only the raw shame externality of L that kept him from accepting:
27
0 > v   H . But, then, if he did accept, he should anticipate that the shame should be
diluted to Hp2 < H by his own diminution of it; since he would not reciprocate. For him
to reject then, when he anticipated this dilution, his shame sensitivity would have to be
very high: H  vp2 : Then, the di¤erence in the shame sensitivity that would keep H from
accepting H > v and the shame sensitivity that should keep H from accepting H  vp2 is
in the shame region v
p2
 H  v:(See dashed rectangle marked (1) in region H < ep1 in
gure 5.)
9 Appendix D: Proofs
Let a2 (g2) be the rate of acceptance of type 2 2 fH;Lg after observing giving with insin-
uation. Similarly, for a2 (g1) but after observing giving only. Since g2 is dominated for the
h, in any equilibrium, g2h = 0. Propositions 1-3 are pooling equilibria in which Proposer l
does not insinuate. Proposition 4 is a separating equilibrium in which l insinuates.
Recall the consistency condition for a PWSE from (6).
2 (I) = r2 (I) ;8I 2 I;82 2 fH;Lg (32)
9.0.1 No Insinuation Equilibria
Proof of Lemma 1. For a xed s1 2 fg2; g1g ; given H (s1) = L (s1) = 0; then regardless
of the value of 2;
 = H (s1)  2 (s1) + L (s1)  (1  2 (s1)) = 0
Therefore, the acceptance condition (a  :a) :
min

e; 1 (s1) 22 (s1)
	  v   2 (s1) ;82 2 fH;Lg
will always be satised since it becomes,
min fe; 0g  v
The reciprocate condition (r  :r) :
1 (s1) 22 (s1)  e;82 2 fH;Lg
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is never satised since 2 (s1) = 0;82 2 fH;Lg regardless of of the value of 1: If both
Responders accept and neither reciprocate, then the l Proposers payo¤ from insinuating
from (3) would be
max
s12fg2;g1g
E (l (s1; r (s1))) = max
s12fg2;g1g
f2 (s1) (rL (s1) R  k) + (1  2 (s1)) (rH (s1) R  k)g
(33)
= max
s12fg2;g1g
f2 (s1) (0R  k) + (1  2 (s1)) (0R  k)g =  k (34)
Proof of Proposition 2. ()) l Proposer pools to g1. Thus, g2l = 0; g2h = 0. Beliefs are
not updated: 1 (g1) = p1: Both Responders accept and reciprocate: aH (g1) = rH (g1) =
aL (g1) = rL (g1) = 1: Therefore, (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  2 (g1) and 1 (g1) 22 (g1)  e;82 2 fH;Lg (35)
Consistency (32) requires H (g1) = rH (g1) = 1 and L (g1) = rL (g1) = 1: Since both types
of Responders took the same action, the updated belief of the Proposer that it is facing the
H type of Responder is equal to her prior: 2 (g1) = p2 in
 (g1) = L (g1)  2 (g1) + H (g1)  (1  2 (g1)) = 1
from (1) : Combined with (35) ; we get (9) and (10).
(()Now suppose that (9) and (10) hold. Since H (g1) = L (g1) = 1; then
 (g1) = L (g1)  2 (g1) + H (g1)  (1  2 (g1)) = 1
Then the condition for both types of Responders to accept and to reciprocate (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  2 (g1) and 12H (g1)  e;82 2 fH;Lg
will be met. Hence, aH (g1) = rH (g1) = aL (g1) = rL (g1) = 1; if the l Proposers pools to g1.
2 (g1) = p2 since the Responders pooled, in which case, 1 (g1) = p1: l will pool to g1 because
he cannot do better by deviating to g2 since both types of Responders are reciprocating.
Therefore nothing that the Responders do after g2 will can perturb the equilibrium path. In
particular, aH (g2) = 1; rH (g2) = 0; aL (g2) = 1; rL (g2) = 0 supports the equilibrium. Thus,
g2l = 0; g2h = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. ()) l Proposer pools to g1. Thus, g2l = 0; g2h = 0. Beliefs are
not updated: 1 (g1) = p1: The L Responder accepts and reciprocates: aL (g1) = rL (g1) = 1:
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Then (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  L (g1) and 1 (g1) LL (g1)  e (36)
Consistency (32) on the equilibrium path requires L (g1) = rL (g1) = 1: The H Responder
does not accept: aH (g1) = 0. The condition for rejection : (a  :a) :
min fe; 1 (g1) HH (g1)g > v   H (g1) (37)
is met for H. The updated belief of the Proposer that it is facing the L type would be
2 (g1) = 1: Then from (1)
 (g1) = L (g1)  2 (g1) + H (g1)  (1  2 (g1)) (38)
 (g1) = 1  1 + H (g1)  0 = 1 (39)
With (39), (36) becomes the rest of (11)
v   e  L and p1L  e
(37) becomes
min fe; p1HH (g1)g > v   H (40)
After rejection beliefs are arbitrary H (g1) 2 f0; 1g.
Let the Responder believe that had he accepted, he would have been expected to recip-
rocate H (g1) = 1: (40) becomes
min fe; p1Hg > v   H
Again, because what happens after rejection cannot a¤ect the equilibrium path, we can set
p1H < e: Hence, H > v   p1H : This is (13a) :
Alternatively, let the Responder believe that had he accepted, he would not have been
expected to reciprocate then H (g1) = 0. (40) becomes
min fe; 0g > v   H
Hence, 0 > v  H : This is (13l) :We can set H (g2) = 0 and L (g2) = 0 o¤ the equilibrium
path. Then, (12) is satised.
(()Now, given that (11) and (13a) hold and suppose the l Proposer pools so that
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1 (g1) = p1. By (11) :
L (g1) = 1;  (g1) = 1; v   e  L and p1L  e
the acceptance and reciprocation are best condition (r  :r; r  :a) is met for L
v   e  L (g1) and 1 (g1) LL (g1)  e (41)
Therefore, aL (g1) = rL (g1) = 1:
By (13a) : H (g1) = 1; p1H < e, then 1 (g1) HH (g1) < e: Also by (13a) : v   p1H <
H and therefore
min fe; p1HHg > v   H
the reject condition : (a  :a) is met for H;
min fe; 1 (g1) HH (g1)g > v   H (g1)
Therefore, aH (g1) = 0. O¤ the equilibrium path, we can set rH (g1) = 0. Since by (41) at
least one type L reciprocated, by (4) the Proposer will make positive prots after g2. By
(12): H (g2) = L (g2) = 0. By Lemma 1, if the l Proposer were to deviate to g2, she would
earn  k < 0. Hence, she will not deviate. Thus, g2l = 0; g2h = 0.
(()Now alternatively, given that (11) and (13l) hold and suppose the l Proposer pools
so that 1 (g1) = p1. By (11) :
L (g1) = 1;  (g1) = 1; v   e  L and p1L  e
Therefore, the acceptance and reciprocation are best condition (r  :r; r  :a) is met for
L
v   e  L (g1) and 1 (g1) LL (g1)  e
Therefore, aL (g1) = rL (g1) = 1: By (13l) :
H (g1) = 0; H > v and p1H < e:
Therefore,
min fe; 0g > v   H (g1)
The reject condition : (a  :a) :
min fe; 1 (g1) HH (g1)g > v   H (g1)
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for H is met. Therefore, aH (g1) =0. O¤ the equilibrium path, we can set rL (g1) = 0.
Since at least one type reciprocated after g1, by (4) the Proposer will make positive
prots after g1. By (12) and Lemma 1, if the l Proposer were to deviate to g2, she would
earn  k < 0. Hence, she will not deviate. Thus, g2l = 0; g2h = 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. ()) l Proposer pools to g1. Thus, g2l = 0; g2h = 0. Beliefs are
not updated: 1 (g1) = p1: The L Responder accepts and reciprocates: aL (g1) = rL (g1) = 1:
Therefore, (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  L (g1) and 1 (g1) LL (g1)  e (42)
Consistency (32) on the equilibrium path requires L (g1) = rL (g1) = 1.
For H, aH (g1) = 1; rH (g1) = 0. The accept (a  :a) :
min fe; 1 (g1) HH (g1)g  v   H (g1)
condition holds but not the reciprocate condition (r  :r) :
1 (g1) HH (g1) < e
Consistency (32) implies, H (g1) = rH (g1) = 0 and therefore,
0  v   H (g1) and 0 < e (43)
To nd  (g1) ; note that since both accepted, the updated belief of the Proposer that it is
facing the L type is equal to her prior, 2 (g1) = p2 in
 (g1) = L (g1)  2 (g1) + H (g1)  (1  2 (g1))
by (1). Hence,
 (g1) = 1  p2 + 0  (1  p2) = p2
The rest of (16) holds. Putting  (g1) = p2 into (42) we have (14) :
v   e  Lp2 and p1L  e
Putting  (g1) = p2 into (43) we have (15) :
0  v   Hp2
32
Since insinuation g2 is o¤ the equilibrium path, beliefs are arbitrary. We can set L (g2) =
H (g2) = 0, which is (17) :
(()Now, suppose that (14) and (16) hold and the l Proposer pools so that 1 (g1) = p1.
By (14) :
v   e  Lp2 and p1L  e
and (16) : L (g1) = 1: Therefore, (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  L (g1) and 1 (g1) LL (g1)  e
Thus, aL (g1) = 1; rL (g1) = 1:
By (15) : 0  v   Hp2 and by (16) : H (g1) = 0; it follows that the not reciprocate is
better than not accept condition (:r  :a) is met for H
v   1 (g1) HH (g1)  H (g1)  0
Along with p1H < e, then : (r  :r) is met:
1 (g1) HH (g1) < e
Therefore, aH (g1) = 1; rH (g1) = 0.
Since at least one type reciprocated, by (4) the Proposer will make positive prots after
g1. By (17) and Lemma 1, if the l Proposer were to deviate to g2, she would earn  k < 0.
Hence, she will not deviate. Thus, g2l = 0; g2h = 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. ()) l Proposer pools to g1. Thus, g2l = 0; g2h = 0. Beliefs are
not updated: 1 (g1) = p1: The H Responder accepts and reciprocates: aH (g1) = rH (g1) =
1: Therefore, (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  H (g1) and 1 (g1) HH (g1)  e (44)
Consistency (32) on the equilibrium path requires H (g1) = rH (g1) = 1.
For L, aL (g1) = 1; rL (g1) = 0. The accept (a  :a) :
min fe; 1 (g1) LL (g1)g  v   L (g1)
condition holds but not the reciprocate condition (r  :r) :
1 (g1) LL (g1) < e
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Consistency (32) implies, L (g1) = rL (g1) = 0 and therefore,
0  v   L (g1) and 0 < e (45)
To nd  (g1) ; note that since both accepted, the updated belief of the Proposer that it is
facing the L type is equal to her prior, 2 (g1) = p2 in
 (g1) = L (g1)  2 (g1) + H (g1)  (1  2 (g1))
by (1). Hence,
 (g1) = 0  p2 + 1  (1  p2) = (1  p2)
The rest of (20) holds. Putting  (g1) = (1  p2) into (44) we have (18) :
v   e  H (1  p2) and p1H  e
Putting  (g1) = (1  p2) into (45) we have (19) :
0  v   L (1  p2)
Since insinuation g2 is o¤ the equilibrium path, beliefs are arbitrary. We can set H (g2) =
L (g2) = 0, which is (21) :
(()Now, suppose that (18) and (20) hold and the l Proposer pools so that 1 (g1) = p1.
By (18) :
v   e  H (1  p2) and p1H  e
and (20) : H (g1) = 1; therefore, (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  H (g1) and 1 (g1) HH (g1)  e
Thus, aH (g1) = 1; rH (g1) = 1:
By (19) : 0  v L (1  p2) and by (20) : L (g1) = 0; it follows that the not reciprocate
is better than not accept condition (:r  :a) is met for L
v   1 (g1) LL (g1)  L (g1)  0
Along with p1L < e, then : (r  :r) is met:
1 (g1) LL (g1) < e
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Therefore, aL (g1) = 1; rL (g1) = 0.
Since at least one type reciprocated, by (4) the Proposer will make positive prots after
g1. By (21) and Lemma 1, if the l Proposer were to deviate to g2, she would earn  k < 0.
Hence, she will not deviate. Thus, g2l = 0; g2h = 0.
Proof of Corollary 6. Suppose as in Eq. 3H that both types of Responders accept and
H reciprocates. But, suppose L also reciprocates. The (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  2 (g1) and 1 (g1) 22 (g1)  e;82 2 fL;Hg
condition would have to be met for both. Since both types reciprocate, consistency (32)
requires H (g1) = L (g1) = 1: Therefore, by (1) :  (g1) = 1: That would violate v  e < H :
If say only H accepts and reciprocates, then H (g1) = 1 and L (g1) = 0. Therefore,
 (g1) = 1, so again, that would violate v   e < H .
9.0.2 Insinuation Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 7. ()) l Proposer separates by insinuating g2: Thus, g2l = 1; g2h =
0. Beliefs are updated: 1 (g2) = 1 and 1 (g1) = 0.
Since aH (g1) = aL (g1) = 1 and rH (g1) = rL (g1) = 0, the condition for reciprocating,
given acceptance (r  :r) :
1 (g1) 22 (g1)  e
must not be met. By consistency (32), H (g1) = L (g1) = 0. Therefore (23) follows.
Since aL (g2) = 1 and rL (g2) = 1, then the condition for accepting and reciprocating for
L (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  L (g2) and 1 (g2) LL (g2)  e (46)
will be met. Consistency (32) on the equilibrium path requires L (g2) = rL (g2) = 1:
aH (g1) = 0 and therefore, the updated belief of the Proposer that it is facing the L type
given acceptance 2 (g2) = 1: Then from (1)
 (g2) = L (g2)  2 (g2) + H (g2)  (1  2 (g2)) = 1 (47)
Substituting into (46) completes (22)
v   e  L and L  e
H does not accept: aH (g2) = 0. Therefore, for H the condition for rejecting must be met
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: (a  :a) :
min fe; 1 (g2) HH (g2)g > v   H (g2) (48)
Since, after rejection, what would have happened after acceptance is o¤-equilibrium, beliefs
are arbitrary: H (g2) 2 f0; 1g :
Let the Responder believe that had he accepted, he would have been expected to recip-
rocate then H (g2) = 1: (48) with (47) becomes
min fe; Hg > v   H
Again, because what happens after rejection cannot a¤ect the equilibrium path, we can set
p1H  e: Therefore, (24a)
H > v   e
Let the Responder believe that had he accepted, he would have been expected to reciprocate
then H (g2) = 0. (48) with (47) becomes
min fe; 0g > v   H
Therefore, (24l).
(()Now, given that (22) ; (23) and (24a) are true and suppose the l Proposer separates
so that 1 (g2) = 1: By (22) :
L (g2) = 1;  (g2) = 1; v   e  L and L  e
The acceptance and reciprocation are best condition (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  L (g2) and 1 (g2) LL (g2)  e (49)
is met for L. Therefore, aL (g2) = 1 and rL (g2) = 1:
By (24a) :
H (g2) = 1; H > v   e and H  e
Therefore
min fe; Hg > v   H
satisfying the reject condition : (a  :a) for H
min fe; 1 (g2) HH (g2)g > v   H (g2)
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Thus, aH (g2) = 0 and we can set rH (g2) = 1:
Since by (49) at least one type L reciprocated, by (4) the Proposer will make positive
prots after g2. By (23) and Lemma 1, if the l Proposer were to deviate to g1, she would
earn  k < 0. Hence, she will not deviate. Thus, g2l = 1; g2h = 0.
Now alternatively, suppose that (22) ; (23) and (24b) are true and the l Proposer separates
so that 1 (g2) = 1. Just as before in (49), the acceptance and reciprocation are best condition
(r  :r; r  :a) is met for L : aL (g2) = 1 and rL (g2) = 1:
By (24b) :
H (g2) = 0; H > v and H  e
Thus,
min fe; 0g > v   H
which implies that reject condition : (a  :a) is met for H
min fe; 1 (g2) HH (g2)g > v   H (g2)
Therefore, aH (g2) = 0. We can then choose rH (g2) = 0 or 1: Since by at least one type L
reciprocated, by (4) the Proposer will make positive prots after g2. By (23) and Lemma 1,
if the l Proposer were to deviate to g1, she would earn  k < 0. Hence, she will not deviate.
Thus, g2l = 1; g2h = 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. ()) l Proposer separates by insinuating: Thus, g2l = 1; g2h = 0.
Beliefs are updated: 1 (g2) = 1 and 1 (g1) = 0. The L Responder accepts and reciprocates:
aL (g2) = rL (g2) = 1: Then (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  L (g2) and 1 (g2) LL (g2)  e (50)
Consistency (32) on the equilibrium path requires L (g2) = rL (g2) = 1: The H Responder
does not accept: aH (g2) = 0. The condition for rejection : (a  :a) :
min fe; 1 (g2) HH (g2)g > v   H (g2) (51)
is met for H. The updated belief of the Proposer that it is facing the L type would be
2 (g2) = 1: Then from (1)
 (g2) = L (g2)  2 (g2) + H (g2)  (1  2 (g2)) (52)
 (g2) = 1  1 + H (g2)  0 = 1 (53)
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With (53), (50) becomes the rest of (25)
v   e  L and L  e
(51) becomes
min fe; HH (g2)g > v   H (54)
After rejection beliefs are arbitrary H (g2) 2 f0; 1g.
Let the Responder believe that had he accepted, he would have been expected to recip-
rocate H (g2) = 1: (54) becomes
min fe; Hg > v   H
Again, because what happens after rejection cannot a¤ect the equilibrium path, we can set
H < e:Hence, H > v   H : This is (27a) :
Alternatively, let the Responder believe that had he accepted, he would not have been
expected to reciprocate then H (g2) = 0. (54) becomes
min fe; 0g > v   H
Hence, 0 > v  H : This is (27l) :We can set H (g1) = 0 and L (g1) = 0 o¤ the equilibrium
path. Then, (26) is satised.
(()Now, given that (25) and (27a) hold and suppose the l Proposer pools so that
1 (g2) = 1 and 1 (g1) = 0. By (25) :
L (g2) = 1;  (g2) = 1; v   e  L and L  e
the acceptance and reciprocation are best condition (r  :r; r  :a) is met for L
v   e  L (g2) and 1 (g2) LL (g2)  e (55)
Therefore, aL (g2) = rL (g2) = 1:
By (27a) : H (g2) = 1; H < e, then 1 (g2) HH (g2) < e: Also by (27a) : v   H < H
and
min fe; HHg > v   H
the reject condition : (a  :a) is met for H;
min fe; 1 (g2) HH (g2)g > v   H (g2)
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Therefore, aH (g2) = 0. O¤ the equilibrium path, we can set rH (g2) = 0. Since by (55) at
least one type L reciprocated, by (4) the Proposer will make positive prots after g2. By
(26) : H (g1) = L (g1) = 0 and Lemma 1, if the l Proposer were to deviate to g1, she would
earn  k < 0. Hence, she will not deviate. Thus, g2l = 1; g2h = 0.
(()Now alternatively, given that (25) and (27b) hold and suppose the l Proposer separate
so that 1 (g2) = 1 and 1 (g2) = 0. By (25) :
L (g2) = 1;  (g2) = 1; v   e  L and L < e
Therefore, the acceptance and reciprocation are best condition (r  :r; r  :a) is met for
L
v   e  L (g2) and 1 (g2) LL (g2) < e (56)
Therefore, aL (g2) = rL (g2) = 1: By (27b) :
H (g2) = 0; H > v and H < e:
Therefore,
min fe; 0g > v   H (g2)
The reject condition : (a  :a) :
min fe; 1 (g2) HH (g2)g > v   H (g2)
for H is met. Therefore, aH (g2) =0. O¤ the equilibrium path, we can set rL (g2) = 0.
Since by (56) at least one type reciprocated after g2, by (4) the Proposer will make
positive prots after g2. By (26) and Lemma 1, if the l Proposer were to deviate to g1, she
would earn  k < 0. Hence, she will not deviate. Thus, g2l = 1; g2h = 0.
Proof of Proposition 9. ()) Proposer separates by insinuating g2: Thus, g2l = 1; g2h = 0.
Beliefs are updated: 1 (g2) = 1 and 1 (g1) = 0. Both Responders accept and reciprocate:
aH (g2) = rH (g2) = aL (g2) = rL (g2) = 1: Therefore, (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  2 (g2) and 1 (g2) 22 (g2)  e;82 2 fH;Lg (57)
Consistency (32) requires H (g2) = rH (g2) = 1 and L (g2) = rL (g2) = 1: Since both types
of Responders took the same action, the updated belief of the Proposer that it is facing the
H type of Responder is equal to her prior: 2 (g2) = p2 in
 (g2) = L (g2)  2 (g2) + H (g2)  (1  2 (g2)) = 1
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from (1) : Combined with (57) ; we get (28) and (29).
(()Now suppose that (28) and (29) hold. Since H (g2) = L (g2) = 1; then
 (g2) = L (g2)  2 (g2) + H (g2)  (1  2 (g2)) = 1
Then the condition for both types of Responders to accept and to reciprocate (r  :r; r  :a) :
v   e  2 (g2) and 12H (g2)  e;82 2 fH;Lg
will be met. Hence, aH (g2) = rH (g2) = aL (g2) = rL (g2) = 1; if the l separates to g2, In
which case, 1 (g2) = 1 and 1 (g1) = 0: l will separate to g2 because he cannot do better
by deviating to g1 since both types of Responders are reciprocating. Therefore nothing that
the Responders do after g1 will can perturb the equilibrium path. In particular, aH (g1) =
1; rH (g1) = 0; aL (g1) = 1; rL (g1) = 0 supports the equilibrium. Thus, g2l = 1; g2h = 0.
Proof of Proposition 10. Recall that the Proposer maximizes the following prot
function.
max
s12fg2;g1g
E (l (s1; r (s1))) = max
s12fg2;g1g
f2 (rL (s1)R  k) + (1  2) (rH (s1)R  k)g
If she preferred Eq. 4L in which she insinuated and only L accepted, 2 (g2) = 1 and
reciprocated rL1 = 1 to Eq. 3H in which both accepted 2 (g1) = p2 but only H reciprocated
rH (g1) = 1 then,
R  k > R (1  p2)  p2k
The proportion of L must be above this threshold.
p2 >
k
(R + k)
Since insinuate is dominated for the h Proposer, upon hearing the insinuating remark, a
rational L Responder will infer that he is facing the l Proposer. As required by Eq. 4L
in (24), if the L Responder believed that he was facing the l Proposer 1 (g2) = 1; he
reciprocates. If L were numerous enough as specied by (30), the l Proposers prot would
increase with such a response from the Responder. Therefore, if the Responder would best
respond only to those types of Proposer that could make the insinuating remark, that type
of Proposers prots would increase by insinuating. Thus, the equilibrium in which the l
Proposer does not insinuate Eq. 3H fails the Intuitive Criterion.
Proof of Proposition 11. Since insinuate is dominated for the h Proposer, upon hearing
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the insinuating remark, a rational L Responder will infer that he is facing the l Proposer. As
required by Eq. 5L in (27) ; if the H Responder believed that he was facing the l Proposer
1 (g2) = 1; he reciprocates. If the b Proposer were to insinuate with such a response from
the Responder, its prots would increase, since the free rider H would not accept, given that
v H < H : Therefore, if the Responder would best respond only to those types of Proposer
that could make the insinuating remark, that type of Proposers prots would increase by
insinuating. Thus, the equilibrium in which the l Proposer does not insinuate Eq. 3:H fails
the Intuitive Criterion.
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